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1. Introduction 
Views about the usefulness and the relevance of the institution of the stock 
market to countries in general, and to developing countries in particular, have 
varied greatly over time.  These assessments, like share prices on the stock 
market itself, tend to be quite volatile.  At the time of the Great Depression of 
the 1930s, the stock market had a bad press.  It was, probably unfairly, blamed 
for the Depression. This led to many popular denunciations of the stock market 
and calls for its reform. However, the most notable and intellectually coherent 
attack against the stock market came from John Maynard Keynes. In a strong 
criticism of the institution he termed the stock market a gambling casino and 
suggested that people should not be surprised by bad outcomes if the decisions 
on society’s investment allocation are left to the vagaries of a gambling casino
1.  
 
By the late 1950s and early 1960s (nearly a quarter of a century later), the stock 
market indices in countries like the US and the UK recovered to their pre-Great 
Depression  levels.  As  a  result  the  stock  market  started  to  regain  public 
confidence.    Subsequently,  in  the  1980s,  there  was a  worldwide  spread  and 
expansion  of  stock  markets  as  a  result  of  the  Brettons  Woods  institutions’ 
structural  adjustment  programmes  that  encouraged  market-oriented  financial 
sector reform which, among other things, explicitly promoted development of 
the stock market. This was an essential element in furthering the neo-liberal 
agenda  of  privatisation  and  deregulation.  However  the  poor  US  economic 
performance relative to European countries and Japan in the 1980s and up to 
1995 led to considerable disquiet in the US over the role of the stock market-
based US financial system and particularly the role of the stock market itself in 
causing the US decline. A blue ribbon commission of 25 leading US specialists, 
under the chairmanship of Professor Michael Porter of Harvard University, was 
appointed  to  examine  these  issues.  Significantly,  the  Commission  included 
Professor  Larry  Summers,  who  later  became  Secretary  of  the  Treasury  and 
President of Harvard University. Professor Porter summed up the conclusions of 
the Commission in the following terms: 
 
‘The  change  in  nature  of  competition  and  the  increasing  pressure  of 
globalisation  make  investment  the  most  critical  determinant  of  competitive 
advantage. Yet the US system of allocating investment capital both within and 
across  companies  is  failing.  This  puts  America  at  a  serious  disadvantage  in 
global competition and ultimately threatens the long term growth of the US 
economy’ (Porter, 1992) 
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These negative views about the stock market-based financial system and its role 
in economic development during the 1980s and early 1990s changed once more 
during the last 10 years, as the US economy experienced relatively spectacular 
expansion, outdoing its industrial competitors in GDP and productivity growth.  
This was quite a remarkable achievement, bearing in mind the US was a frontier 
economy  and  not  a  catch-up  economy.    It  has  to  generate  and  apply  new 
technological breakthroughs in order to progress and it has been argued that the 
institution of the stock market has been particularly been helpful to the US in 
this  regard.  It  has  enabled,  it  is  suggested,  the  US  to  adopt  information 
technology  much  more  quickly  than  other  advanced  countries  (see  further 
Summers (1999) and Feldstein (1999)).  
 
In this paper, a modest objective of which is to review the main issues in the 
light of available analyses and evidence, I explore whether the institution of the 
stock  market  is  likely  to  be  helpful  to  developing  countries  in  promoting 
development of their real economy and ensuring fast industrial growth. The case 
for  and  against  the  stock  market  inevitably  involves  a  discussion  of  the 
important  related  subjects  of  corporate  finance,  corporate  governance  and 
corporate law. As we shall see, the questions of the relationship between the 
legal system and the stock market and that between corporate finance and the 
stock market are salient to our assessment of the role of the stock market in 
economic  development.  Contrary  to  a  large  part  of  the  literature,  the  paper 
contributes by arriving at a negative overall assessment of the institution of 
stock market in relation to economic development. It also contributes by its 
policy proposals concerning the markets for corporate control which again are 
in conflict with much of the conventional wisdom on the subject. 
 
The paper is organised as follows. Section 2 outlines differing views on the role 
of  the  stock  market  particularly  in  encouraging  invention  and  innovation  in 
developed countries and its potential role in developing countries. Section 3 
provides some illustrative statistical information on stock markets in countries 
at differing levels of development and per capita income. Section 4 considers 
the  question  of  corporate  finance  and  how  developing  country  corporations, 
which are listed on domestic stock markets, finance their growth. Comparisons 
are made between developed and developing countries regarding their corporate 
financing patterns, and the implications of the similarities and differences for 
economic policy as well as for economic theory will be explored. Section 5 
considers the question of the market for corporate control and its implications 
for corporate governance. Section 6 reviews the new literature on law, finance 
and development and outlines important hypotheses concerning legal origin and 
how these affect stock market development. Section 7 analyses the question of   3
regulation of the stock market in relation to developing countries. Section 8 
provides a brief conclusion. 
 
2. The Broad Debate about the Stock Market: Analytical and Policy Issues 
Notwithstanding  Keynes,  a  surprisingly  large  constituency  favours  the 
establishment  of  the  stock  markets  to  promote  economic  development  in 
emerging economies. As mentioned above, the IMF and the World Bank have, 
of  course,  fully  supported  the  institution  of  the  stock  market  and  helped 
developing countries in various ways to either establish them or to encourage 
their growth (Singh, 1993, Sudweeks, 1990). The Bretton Woods institutions’ 
reasoning  has  been  straightforward.  First,  they  suggest  that  in  the  post-war 
period many third world governments established the so-called Direct Finance 
Institutions (DFIs) to provide finance for industrialisation. But these institutions 
were deemed to be unsuccessful in that they resulted in a large incidence of 
non-performing  loans,  crony  capitalism  and  inflationary  finance.  The  stock 
market is seen as a preferred market-based institution to mobilise resources for 
industrial development. Even were the DFIs working well, it is suggested that 
the establishment of the stock market would provide a competing source of 
finance to the benefit of the country’s industrialisation.[ see for example World 
Bank 1989]. 
 
A second important International Financial Institution (IFI) argument in favour 
of the stock market is that it represents ‘natural progression’ in the development 
of  a  country’s  economic  institutions  as  a  country  reaches  a  higher  stage  of 
economic  development.  The  latter,  it  is  suggested,  inevitably  leads  to  the 
development of the stock market. 
 
Interestingly,  the  institution  of  the  stock  market  is  also  favoured  by  the 
communist party in China. The former Chinese leader Zhao Zhi Yang provided 
a spirited defence of the stock market particularly for a developing communist 
country.  Arguing  in  Marxist  terminology,  Zhao  suggested  that  during  the 
‘primary  state  of  socialism’,  and  the  ‘commodity  production’  stages  of  the 
development of a socialist economy, it is necessary to use various market forms, 
including the stock market. Zhao argued that such institutions should not simply 
be regarded as a preserve of capitalism: socialism should also take advantage of 
them, whilst minimizing their harmful effects.
2 He noted that a socialist country 
is better able to preempt the latter through regulation.  
 
Helmut  Reisen  (1994),  an  OECD  economist,  provided  another  rationale  for 
third world stock markets. He argued that the development of such markets 
would be pareto-optimal since it provided the possibility for older first world   4
citizens  to  use  their  pension  funds  and  other  savings  resources  to  invest  in 
younger  more  profitable  third  world  countries  and  thereby  earning  their 
investors a higher rate of return than otherwise. At the same time, third world 
countries  would  obtain  the  critical  foreign  exchange  needed  for  economic 
development. Similar approval of the stock market was expressed by a World 
Institute for Development Economics Research (WIDER) study group which, in 
the 1980s, argued that, because of the debt crisis, developing countries will not, 
in foreseeable future, be able to borrow from the international banks. However, 
the former still had an opportunity to tap the fast growing institutional savings 
of the first world citizens. This would however only be possible if  developing 
countries were to have well established equity markets. 
 
Intellectual  support  for  the  stock  market  also  came  from  Professor  Larry 
Summers,  among  others.  An  erstwhile  critic  of  the  stock  market,  Summers 
became a firm supporter in the 1990s. He argued that the US stock market was, 
in large measure, responsible for the structural change experienced in the US 
economy in the 1990s. This had enabled it to recover from low productivity 
growth  of  the  period  1980  to  1995,  and  achieve  higher  productivity  growth 
between  1995  and  2005.  This  transformation,  according  to  Summers,  was 
brought about by the take-over mechanism on the stock market, which led to a 
huge reallocation of resources in the US economy leading to faster productivity 
growth. Similarly, Summers suggested that through the system of stock options 
the US stock market is better able to align the interests of managers with those 
of shareholders (Summers, 1999). It was also pointed out that the US stock 
market  promotes  technological  progress  through  the  venture  capital  route. 
Through  the  latter,  it  ensures  that  the  US  is  able  to  provide  much  greater 
incentives for technological innovation than the institutional arrangements in 
other countries. One reason for the higher pay-off for inventors and innovators 
in the Anglo-Saxon system is precisely the exit mechanism through take-overs, 
which the US system allows, normally permitting the target company to be sold 
on the stock market with a sizable capital gain. It has been noted that other 
countries such as Germany, which have tried to emulate the US system in this 
respect, have not succeeded because traditional attitudes to involuntary take-
overs still prevail (Black and Gilson, 1998). 
 
On the critical side, however, there still persist the arguments of Michael Porter 
and his colleagues regarding the shortcomings of the US financial system, and 
these remain unanswered. To put these objections in more specific terms, the 
critics  suggest  that  the  stock  market  engenders  short-termism  and  quick 
financial  gains  rather  than  long-term  investment.  The  short  time  horizon  is 
thought  to  be  inimical  both  to  competitiveness  and  fostering  economic   5
development. The bursting of the technology share prices bubble in 2000 – the 
so-called ‘dot com boom and bust’ – has provided further support for the critics 
of the stock market.  
 
These  unresolved  controversies  about  the  merits  and  demerits  of  the  stock 
market  in  fostering  technical  change  in  developed  countries  suggest  that 
developing countries need to weigh carefully the implications of this institution 
for  economic  development.  The  sections  below  extend  this  discussion  by 
outlining  other  channels,  including  ones  suggested  by  textbook  economic 
theory, through which the stock market can promote economic development. 
The  available  empirical  evidence  on  these  channels  of  transmission  is  also 
presented and evaluated . It is further asked whether the negative features of the 
stock  market,  such  as  share-price  bubbles  or  prolonged  depressed  levels  of 
prices, can be ameliorated if not eliminated by public regulation.  
 
3. Stock Markets in Small, Poor Developing Economies 
My remit is to discuss a) whether poor countries, particularly in Africa, will 
benefit  from  establishing  stock  markets,  and  b)  whether  low-  and  middle-
income countries in general will gain from encouraging the expansion of these 
markets. Before tackling these questions (some of which have been elaborated 
in  the  sections  above),  a  few  statistics  on  the  dimensions  of  African  stock 
markets in particular are in order.  
 
 In recent years, stock markets have been created in many countries in sub-
Saharan Africa. Prior to 1989 there were just five stock markets in sub-Saharan 
Africa and three in North Africa. Today there are nineteen in Africa. Apart from 
South Africa, most African stock markets are small, with few listed companies, 
low market capitalisation and low turnover of shares. The South African stock 
market  is  approximately  ten  times  as  large  as  the  rest  of  the  Sub-Saharan 
African stock markets combined. Indeed it is one of the largest among emerging 
economies  (Yates  2007).  Tables  1-3  provide  data  on  three  widely  used 
indicators  of  stock  market  development:  (a)  market  capitalisation  as  a 
proportion of GDP (b) turnover ratio (trading value as a proportion of market 
capitalisation) and (c) number of listed companies. The tables contain data on 
ten sub-Saharan African stock markets, three north-African stock markets and 
for comparative purposes on six other selected emerging markets, as well as two 
advanced countries, namely the UK and Italy.  It is significant that the South 
African stock market is of similar size as those of stock markets in leading 
emerging countries in Asia and Latin America. Analytically, it is therefore best 
treated as a part of the leading emerging markets group. 
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Turning to the small African countries, including those with recently established 
stock markets, a key issue is whether there is a viable future for these stock 
markets in the era of globalization and ever closer financial integration in the 
world economy.  Gugler, Mueller and Yurtoglu (2004) suggest that, irrespective 
of whether they engage in foreign investment, large companies worldwide will 
be  forced  by  competition  for  capital  to  enlist  on  the  world’s  biggest  stock 
exchanges, such as those of New York and London, where the cheapest external 
capital will be found. In this scenario, there is not much place for most national 
stock exchanges except to serve the local needs of small- and medium-sized 
enterprises.  
 
This would appear at one level to be hopeful for small African stock markets to 
the extent that they can cater to the capital requirements of smallish domestic 
companies. However, there are other precedents which are not so helpful. For 
example,  at  the  beginning  of  the  twentieth  century  in  England  there  were 
nineteen  provincial  stock  exchanges  situated  in  cities  like  Birmingham  and 
Manchester.  Economic  historians  tell  us  that  they  performed  very  useful 
functions including raising substantial amounts of equity capital for local firms 
and worked on the basis of trust rather than formal legal rules (Lavington, 1921; 
Thomas 1973). However, none of these provincial exchanges function today. 
The economies of scale enjoyed by the London stock exchange in its operations 
have  overwhelmed  all  small  stock  exchanges.  It  is  also  unlikely  that  small 
African national exchanges could survive by joining together into regional stock 
exchanges. This is largely due to the fact that there are big differences between 
countries with respect to law, custom, working culture and accounting standards 
(Yartey, 2008). A merger of the exchanges may prove to be unviable and not 
cost effective.  
 
Singh (1999) presented a somewhat different argument for not encouraging the 
establishment of stock markets in African countries at their current stage of 
development, suggesting that they should focus on reforming and improving the 
banking  system  to  provide  for  the  capital  requirements  of  local  firms.  The 
banking  system  is  more  likely  to  meet  the  needs  of  ordinary  savers  and 
investors  than  are  stock  markets.  Furthermore,  a  sound  banking  system  is 
generally  regarded  by  development  economists  as  a  pre-requisite  for  stock 
market  development.  Does  the  experience  of  the  last  ten  years  suggest  a 
revision of these policy  recommendations?    7
 
Table 1: Stock Markets in Africa and in Selected Developing and Advanced Economies, Market 
Capitalisation, and Relative GDP 
 
Sub-Saharan Africa       
Country  Market Cap.  Proportion of GDP 
   US$ mn   
  1994  2003  1994 
Botswana  377  2131  0.98 
Cote d'Ivoire  428  1650  0.48 
Ghana  1873  1426  0.20 
Kenya  3082  4178  0.44 
Mauritius  1514  1955  0.44 
Namibia  201  308  0.06 
Nigeria  2711  9494  0.07 
South Africa  225,718  267,745  1.85 
Swaziland  338  172  0.11 
Zimbabwe  1828  4975  0.12 
       
North Africa       
Country  Market Cap.  Proportion of GDP 
  US$ mn   
  1994  2003  1994 
Egypt  4,263  27,073  0.13 
Tunisia  2,561  2,464  0.16 
Morocco  4,376  13,152  0.06 
       
Other Emerging Markets     
Country  Market Cap.  Proportion of GDP 
  US$ mn   
  1994  2003  1994 
India  127,515  279,093  0.44 
Thailand  131,479  118,705  0.92 
Malaysia  199,276  168,376  2.75 
Korea  191,778  392,616  0.50 
Brazil  189,281  234,560  0.34 
Mexico  130,246  122,532  0.35 
       
Advanced Country Markets     
Country  Market Cap.  Proportion of GDP 
  US$ mn   
  1994  2003  1994 
Italy  180,135  614,842  0.16 
UK  1,210,245  2,412,434  1.13 
         8
 
Table 2: Stock Markets in Africa and in Selected Developing and Advanced Economies, Trading Value 
and Turnover Ratio   
   
Sub-Saharan Africa               
Country  Trading Value    Turnover Ratio     
  US$ mn    (%)     
  1994  2003    1991  1995    2003 
Botswana  31.0  87.0    3.1  10.0    4.1 
Cote d'Ivoire  12.0  24.0    1.4  2.2    1.5 
Ghana  75.0  45.0    0.4  1.3    3.2 
Kenya  62.0  209.0    2.6  2.8    5.0 
Mauritius  85.0  99.0    1.9  4.6    5.1 
Namibia  18.0  2.0    0.0  1.6    0.7 
Nigeria  18.0  858.0    0.6  0.8    9.0 
South Africa  15,607.0  102,808.0    7.2  6.5    38.4 
Swaziland  2.0  0.0    1.7  0.1    0.0 
Zimbabwe  176.0  1,345.0    4.2  7.6    27.0 
               
North Africa               
Country  Trading Value    Turnover Ratio     
  US$ mn    (%)     
  1994  2003    1991  1995    2003 
Egypt  757  3,278    2.6  10.9    12.11 
Tunisia  296  164    5.3  19.8    6.65 
Morocco  788  694    4.2  45.9    5.27 
               
Other Emerging Markets             
Country  Trading Value    Turnover Ratio     
  US$ mn    (%)     
  1994  2003    1991  1995    2003 
India  27,376.0  284,802.0    56.8  10.5    102.0 
Thailand  80,188.0  96,573.0    102.2  41.4    81.4 
Malaysia  126,458.0  50,135.0    20.2  35.9    29.8 
Korea  286,056.0  682,706.0    82.3  97.8    173.9 
Brazil  109,498.0  60,435.0    22.0  47.8    25.8 
Mexico  82,964.0  23,489.0    47.9  33.0    19.2 
               
Advanced Country Markets             
Country  Trading Value    Turnover Ratio     
  US$ mn    (%)     
  1994  2003    1991  1995    2003 
Italy  117,894  663,211    45  n.a    107.86 
UK  464,085  2,150,753    77  n.a    177.71 
 
Source: IFC Factbooks (various issues)   9
 
Table 3: Number of Listed Companies 
Sub-Saharan Africa 
Country  # Listed Companies 
  1994  2003 
Botswana  11  94 
Cote d'Ivoire  27  66 
Ghana  17  25 
Kenya  56  51 
Mauritius  35  40 
Namibia  8  13 
Nigeria  177  200 
South Africa  640  426 
Swaziland  4  5 
Zimbabwe  64  81 
     
North Africa 
Country  # Listed Companies 
  1994  2003 
Egypt  700  967 
Tunisia  21  46 
Morocco  51  53 
     
Other Emerging Markets 
Country  # Listed Companies 
  1994  2003 
India  4413  5644 
Thailand  389  405 
Malaysia  478  897 
Korea  699  1563 
Brazil  544  367 
Mexico  206  159 
     
Source: IFC Factbooks (various issues)   
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4. Stock Markets and Economic Development: the Case of Middle-Income 
Developing Economies with Established Stock Markets  
Leaving aside the question of stock markets in sub-Saharan African countries, 
an important question for this paper is whether and how the encouragement of 
these markets in the average middle-income developing country would assist 
their  industrialisation  and  economic  development.  The  relationship  between 
stock markets and technological development was discussed in sections 1 and 2 
above. Other ways in which the stock market can assist development are taken 
up here. According to orthodox economic theory, a stock market can contribute 
to  development  through  a  variety  of  channels:  it  could  raise  savings  and 
investment by making it possible for individuals and households to purchase a 
fraction of a shipyard or a steel mill, thereby spreading the risk, without which 
investment may not occur at all. Similarly the monitoring function performed 
automatically and from the perspective of an entrepreneur, costlessly, by the 
stock market also helps raise investment. Moreover, a well-functioning stock 
market  purportedly  allocates  resources  more  efficiently  through  its  normal 
pricing process,  which would accord, other things being equal, higher share 
prices to efficient firms and lower prices to inefficient ones. Furthermore, the 
take-over  mechanism  ostensibly  ensures  that  not  just  the  new  investment 
resources but also the existing capital stock is efficiently utilised.  Inefficient 
use  of  existing  resources  is  punished  by  the  market  for  corporate  control 
through disciplinary takeovers. 
 
How effectively the stock market can perform the above tasks depends on the 
efficiency  of  two  critical  market  mechanisms,  namely  (a)  the  pricing 
mechanism and (b) the take-over mechanism. These are central issues of debate 
on which there is a voluminous literature, which is briefly reviewed below. 
 
Determination of share prices
3 
The orthodox paradigm of share price determination postulates that share prices 
are  efficient  because  they  emanate  from  perfect  markets  involving  large 
numbers of well-informed buyers and sellers in which no one buyer or seller 
can  influence  the  price  and  where  there  is  a  homogeneous  product,  namely 
shares. There is, however, an alternative paradigm indicated by the quotation 
from  Keynes  cited  earlier  that  characterizes  stock  markets  essentially  as 
gambling  casinos  dominated  by  speculators.  Stiglitz  (1994);  Allen  and  Gale 
(2000); Shiller, (2000), Shleifer (2000), Baker  and Wurgler (2007), Hong and 
Stein  (2007)  and  not  least  students  of  behavioural  finance  (see  for  example 
Barberis and Thaler, 2003, Hong et al (2007) and Baker et al (2007),formalize 
the various elements of this paradigm. In brief, this literature suggests that, in 
the face of highly uncertain future, share prices are likely to be influenced by   11 
the so-called ‘noise traders’, and by whims, fads and contagion. For similar 
reasons of psychology, investors may attribute much greater weight to near-
term price forecasts rather than historical long-term performance. This line of 
reasoning  is  taken  further  in  the  growing  literature  on  behavioural  finance 
(Refer to above). 
 
Until recently, the empirical literature on share prices has been dominated by 
the  so-called  ‘efficient  markets  hypothesis’  (EMH),  which  argues  that  real 
world share prices are efficient in the sense that they incorporate all available 
information (Fama, 1970). In the 1970s, evidence in favour of this hypothesis 
was  thought  to  be  overwhelming,  with  enthusiasts  regarding  it  as  the  best-
documented hypothesis throughout the social sciences (Jensen, 1978). In the 
1980s and 1990s, with (a) the 1987 US stock market crash, (b) the meltdown in 
the Asian stock markets in the 1990s and (c) the bursting of the technology 
stocks  bubble  in  2000,  the  EMH  has  suffered  fundamental  setbacks.  Alan 
Greenspan (1998) has commented as follows on the reasons for (a) and (b): ‘At 
one point the economic system appears stable, the next it behaves as though a 
dam has reached a breaking point, and water (read, confidence) evacuates the 
reservoir. The United States experienced such a sudden change with the decline 
in stock prices of  more than 20 percent on October 19, 1987. There is no 
credible  scenario  that  can  readily  explain  so  abrupt  a  change  in  the 
fundamentals of long-term valuations on that one day…But why do these events 
seem  to  erupt  without  some  readily  evident  precursors?  Certainly,  the  more 
extended  the  risk-taking,  or  more  generally,  the  lower  the  discount  factors 
applied to future outcomes, the more vulnerable are markets to a shock that 
abruptly  triggers  a  revision  in  expectations  and  sets  off  a  vicious  cycle  of 
contraction…Episodes of vicious cycles cannot be easily forecast, as our recent 
experience with Asia has demonstrated. ‘  
 
Kindleberger (1989) similarly documented about thirty cases of unwarranted 
euphoria and excessive pessimism on the stock markets since the South-Sea 
bubble of 1720. He termed these episodes as manias, panics and crashes.  
 
Tobin (1984) made an analytically useful distinction  between two kinds of 
efficiency of stock markets, (a) the information arbitrage efficiency that ensures 
that all information concerning a firm’s shares immediately percolates to all 
stock market participants, ensuring that no participant can make a profit on such 
public information; (b) fundamental valuation efficiency, that is, share prices 
accurately  reflect  a  firm’s  fundamentals,  namely  the  long-term  expected 
profitability. The growing consensus view is that, in these terms, stock markets 
may at best be regarded as being efficient in the sense of (a) but far from being   12 
efficient in the economically more important sense (b). Thus EMH, as identified 
in a, is compatible with share prices not reflecting fundamental values.   
 
The latter proposition may be illustrated by considering the case of the recent 
dotcom  boom  and  burst  in  the  US.  The  main  stock  market  for  technology 
company shares there is NASDAQ. In 1995, the value of the NASDAQ index 
was 1052.1; by 1998, it doubled to 2192.7; in the next twelve months, it nearly 
doubled again to 4069.3 on 31 December 1999. At its peak in March 2000, the 
value  of  the  index  was  5063.3.  Over  the  following  three  years,  NASDAQ 
crashed to 1335.5, less than a fourth of its value at the peak. This pattern of 
share price movement on NASDAQ looks prima facie like a classical share 
price bubble, followed by a bust. These prices could not be efficient in the 
fundamental valuation sense, simultaneously both at the top of the boom and in 
the trough. This is because there was little evidence of a change of the required 
magnitude  in  the  economic  fundamentals  during  this  period.  True,  the  US 
economy had a trend increase in long-term productivity growth rate, but there 
were no dramatic changes in the growth of corporate earnings and dividends. 
While the share prices soared, the latter continued to expand at their normal far 
slower pace (Shiller 2000). 
 
A more detailed discussion as well as other examples of share prices evidently 
departing  from  their  fundamentals  are  provided  in  Singh  et  al  2005.  It  is 
generally accepted that such mis-pricing of shares is a common occurrence on 
the stock market and it may persist for a considerable period, some would say 
for as much as 10 –20 years.  The Nikkei stock market index in Japan reached a 
value of approximately 38000 in the mid-1980s. Twenty-five years later, it has 
not recovered to even half the 1980s value. Evidence suggests a share price 
bubble on the Tokyo stock market in the mid-1980s. Similarly, UK and US 
stock markets did not recover to their pre-great depression index values until the 
mid-50s.   
 
To sum up, analyses and evidence suggests that the average firm share prices 
may depart from the fundamentals for prolonged periods. Many friends of the 
stock market while acknowledging the likelihood of mis-pricing suggest that the 
latter persists only for three or four years rather than ten or twenty (Jensen 
2005). In case of developing countries, there is a further difficulty. Apart from 
the normal mis-pricing, which is particularly likely to be severe in developing 
countries  as  their  firms  do  not  have  a  long  track  record,  share  prices  in 
developing countries are more volatile than in advanced countries (see further 
Singh  (1997);  Kumar  and  El-arian  (1996,1997)).  Share  price  volatility  is 
however a negative feature of stock markets for several reasons. First, it reduces   13 
the efficiency of the price signals in allocating investment resources. Secondly, 
it  increases  the  riskiness  of  investments  and  may  discourage  risk-averse 
corporations  from  financing  their  growth  by  equity  issues  and  indeed  from 
seeking a stock market listing at all. Thirdly, at the macroeconomic level, a 
highly  volatile  stock  market  may  lead  to  financial  fragility  for  the  whole 
economy (Singh 1999; 2000). 
 
The take-over mechanism and the market for corporate control 
The market for corporate control is thought to be the evolutionary endpoint of 
stock  market  development.    The  ability  of  an  outside  group  of  investors  to 
acquire a corporation, often through a hostile bid, is the hallmark of the stock 
market dominated US and U.K. financial systems. The textbook interpretation 
of takeovers is that they improve efficiency by transferring corporate assets to 
those who can manage them more productively.  Consequently, more effective 
managers emerge who can raise the firm’s profitability and share price.  Even if 
current  managers  are  not  replaced,  an  active  market  for  corporate  control 
presents a credible threat that inefficient managers will be replaced and thus 
ensures that the incumbent management actively seeks to maximize shareholder 
value and thereby raises corporate performance.  Even if quoted firms were not 
directly susceptible to changes in share prices because they finance themselves 
almost exclusively from internal finance (as the pecking order theory implies; 
see  section  V  below),  the  market  for  corporate  control  can  still  discipline 
managers.  Furthermore,  even if all firms  are on the efficiency frontier, the 
amalgamation of some through the act of takeovers may lead to a better social 
allocation of resources via synergy.  
 
However,  a  critical  school  has  developed  a  multifaceted  critique  that  has 
increasingly questioned the above textbook version of the market for corporate 
control.  First, a number of analysts in the critical school have pointed out that 
in the real world the market for corporate control, even in advanced economies, 
has an inherent flaw in its operation: it is far easier for a large firm to take over 
a small one than the other way around (Singh, 1971, 1975, 1992).  In principle, 
it is possible that a small efficient firm may take over a larger and less efficient 
company (and to a degree this occurred in the US takeover wave of the 1980s 
through ‘junk bonds’), its incidence is very small (Hughes, 1989).      
 
This consideration is particularly important for developing countries like India 
where there are large, potentially predatory conglomerate groups (Singh, 1995).  
These could take over smaller, more efficient firms and thereby reduce potential 
competition to the detriment of the real economy.  In a takeover battle it is the 
absolute firepower (absolute size) that counts rather than the relative efficiency.    14 
Therefore,  the  development  of  an  active  market  for  corporate  control  may 
encourage  managers  to  ‘empire-build’  not  only  to  increase  their  monopoly 
power but also to progressively shield themselves from takeover by becoming 
larger (see further Singh, 1975, 1992). 
 
Secondly,  the  efficient  operation  of  the  takeover  mechanism  requires  that 
enormous amounts of information are widely available.  Specifically, market 
participants require information on the profitability of corporations under their 
existing management and what its prospective profitability would be under an 
alternative  management  if  it  were  taken  over.    It  has  been  noted  that  such 
information  is  not  easily  available  even  in  advanced  countries  and  this 
informational deficit is likely to be greater in developing countries.   
 
Thirdly, takeovers are a very expensive way of changing management (Peacock 
and  Bannock,  1991).    There  are  huge  transactions  costs  associated  with 
takeovers in countries like the US and UK which hinder the efficiency of the 
takeover  mechanism.    Given  the  lower  income  levels  in  the  developing 
countries, these costs are likely to be proportionally heavier in these countries.  
It should also be borne in mind that highly successful countries such as Japan, 
Germany and France have not had an active market for corporate control and 
have thus avoided these costs, while still maintaining systems for disciplining 
managers.    Furthermore,  there  is  no  evidence  that  corporate  governance 
necessarily  improves  after  takeovers.    This  is  for  the  simple  reason  that  all 
takeovers are not disciplinary; in many of them the acquiring firm is motivated 
by empire-building considerations or even by asset-stripping..   
 
Fourthly, there is theoretical work (see for example Stein, 1989) which suggests 
that even if managers wish to maximise shareholder wealth, it would pay them 
to be myopic in a world of takeovers and signal-jamming.  Thus, takeovers 
could  exacerbate  the  already  present  tendencies  towards  short-termism  in  a 
stock market-based system. 
 
Fifthly,  it  has  been  argued  that  takeovers  can  be  used  as  a  device  to  avoid 
honouring  implicit  contracts  developed  between  workers  and  the  former 
management  (Shleifer  and  Summers,  1988).    This  abandonment  of  implicit 
contracts  can  be  argued  to  be  socially  harmful  in  that  it  discourages  the 
accumulation of firm-specific human capital by workers.  The absence of strong 
worker-protection  laws  in  many  developing  countries  means  that  such 
considerations may be significant. 
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In view of the foregoing considerations, it is not surprising that although there 
exists  a  very  active  market  for  corporate  control  in  the  major  Anglo-Saxon 
countries,  it  is  seriously  inefficient.  Two  kinds  of  evidence  support  this 
conclusion.  First,  studies  of  the  take-over  selection  process  indicate  that 
selection in the market for corporate control takes place only to a limited extent 
on the basis of the target firm’s performance and much more so on the basis of 
its size. A large relatively unprofitable firm has a much smaller chance of being 
acquired than a small profitable firm. Secondly, controlling for other relevant 
variables, studies of post-merger profitability of amalgamating firms indicate 
that there is at best no improvement on average in post-merger profits but most 
likely a decline (Ravenscraft and Scherer (1987), Scherer (2006), Singh (1992), 
Tichy (2002). To the extent that an increase in market power is associated with 
mergers, the lack of such an increase suggests a micro-economic inefficiency in 
resource utilization, certainly not an improvement. 
 
A  related  set  of  financial  studies  –  the  so-called  ‘events  studies’  –  suggest, 
however, that in US take-overs the acquiring firms suffer a sizeable decline in 
share prices in the period of six months to three years following the merger. The 
gainers are mainly the acquired firms whose share prices may rise by up to 20 
per cent on average (Jensen, 1988). This poses serious incentive problems as 
potential acquiring firms stand to lose rather than to gain.  Equally importantly, 
in order to classify these gains to the shareholders of acquired firms as being 
social gains, the analysis has to assume that share prices are always efficient in 
the fundamental valuation sense, which, as indicated above, is far from being 
the case. The rise in the share price of the acquired firm may reflect simply the 
price for control which empire builders are willing to pay even to the detriment 
of their own shareholders (Singh 2000). 
 
Further,  a  priori  analysis  as  well  as  evidence  indicates  that  in  practice  the 
imperfections of the pricing and the take-over processes together may lead to 
‘short-termism’ on the part of corporate managements. This is reflected in the 
fact that the latter are obliged to fulfil the market analysts’ short-term (quarterly 
or six-monthly) expectations of the firms’ earnings per share. Evidence suggests 
that if such short-term targets are not met, there is a fall in share prices making 
the firm cetris paribus vulnerable to take-over.  
 
The existence of take-over mechanisms not only induces short-termism, but also 
as  Jensen  (2005)  emphasises,  a  change  in  the  culture  and  operations  of  the 
corporations leading to such pathological cases as Enron and Worldcom. Jensen 
seeks to explain the ‘forces’ bearing on the many firms who experienced large 
rises in share prices and subsequent declines during the ICT bubble in 2000.   16 
Jensen blames the mispricing of shares which is ubiquitous in stock markets on 
deficiencies in corporate governance. He regards overvalued equity as being a 
bigger problem than undervalued equity. Jensen notes that although the market 
for corporate control could solve the problem of undervalued equity, it cannot 
solve the agency problems of overvalued equity. ‘This is because it is difficult 
to buy-up an overvalued company, eliminate its overvalue and make a profit.’ 
He  cites  many  examples  of  subsequent  value  destruction  because  of 
overvaluation of equity by analysts, stock brokers and others during the stock 
market euphoria. 
 
In a closely related but more general sense, the dominance of stock markets can 
also result in the unhealthy ascendancy of finance over production, and that of 
financial engineering (through the take-over process) over the normal long-term 
entrepreneurial  tasks  of  introducing  technical  change,  reducing  costs  and 
improving products.  
 
5. Corporate Finance, the Stock Market and Corporate Governance  
A  central  function  of  the  stock  market  is  to  finance  corporate  growth.  The 
nature of finance in turn affects corporate governance. Although the manner in 
which corporations are governed is affected by many factors, the ownership and 
control of a company’s shares are bound to be affected by the manner in which 
the  companies  are  financed.  For  example,  if  they  are  primarily  financed  by 
creditors, say bank debt, the managers’ first concern will be to earn at least the 
level of profit required to finance the debt. If, on the other hand, the principal 
financing is provided by equity shareholders, managers may earn any rate of 
profit to finance dividends, which rise and fall with the profits, but with the risk 
of take-over by another company, if share prices are too low. 
 
This, of course, also describes the nature of the agency problem in the normal 
US/UK corporation. Managers are supposed to look after the interests of the 
shareholders, but the latter, for various reasons, may not be able to motivate the 
managers to act in their interest  rather than those of the  management itself.  
 
The  corporate  governance  question  will  be  discussed  analytically  and 
empirically below in two stages. Firstly, we will enquire, how do emerging 
firms finance their growth, i.e., to what extent firms use retained profits or long-
term debt or new equity to pay for the expansion of their net assets? At the 
second stage the implications of the observed financing patterns for corporate 
governance will be examined. 
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Singh and Hamid (1992) and Singh (1995), were among the first large scale 
studies  of  financing  corporate  growth  in  emerging  markets.  These  studies 
arrived  at  theoretically  quite  unexpected  conclusions:  Developing  country 
corporations  rely  far  more  on  external  that  on  internal  finance,  and  within 
external finance, they use equity finance to a surprisingly large degree. (See 
Table 4.)  
 
Table 4: The financing of corporate growth in ten emerging markets 
during the 1980s 
       




Brazil  56.4  36  7.7 
India  40.5  19.6  39.9 
Jordan  66.3  22.1  11.6 
Malaysia  35.6  46.6  17.8 
Mexico  24.4  66.6  9 
Pakistan  74  1.7  24.3 
Republic of Korea  19.5  49.6  30.9 
Thailand  27.7  NA  NA 
Turkey  15.3  65.1  19.6 
Zimbabwe  58  38.8  3.2 
All  38.8  39.3  20.8 
F1  20.0*  31.4*  21.2* 
F2  16.69*  18.93*  6.38* 
 
Note:  1. F-statistic  for  comparison  of  means  across  countries.  ‘*’  implies  rejection  of  the  null 
hypothesis  of  the  equality  of  means.  2.  Bartlett-Box  F-statistic  for  variance  across  countries.  ‘*’ 
implies rejection of the null hypothesis of equality of variance. 3. External finance LTD refers to 
long-term debt. The accounting identity, which is the basis of the figures in this table, ensures that the 
total growth of net assets equals the sum of internal and external sources of financing growth. The 
external sources are subdivided into: (a) new equity issues, and (b) long-term debt.    
   
Source: Singh (1995). 
 
The reasons why Table 4 figures are so surprising is conveyed in part by the 
data reported in Table 5 for advanced countries (ACs).  It is not surprising in 
itself  that  there  should  be  differences  between  AC  and  DC  corporations  in 
relation to how they would meet their financing requirements. However, what is 
observed is totally opposite to what economic analysis would predict to be the 
nature of the differences between the two groups. However, it may be noted that 
the pattern of finance reported in Table 5 for AC corporations themselves is 
fully compatible with the so called ‘pecking order’ theory of finance. The latter   18 
suggests that firms will choose sources of external finance for their investment 
needs in the following order. Firstly, they will rely on internal sources (i.e., 
retentions) as much as they can; if they require more finance, they will borrow 
from the banks, and will go to the stock market only as a last resort.  
 
Table 5:  Net sources of finance for Germany, Japan, U.K. and U.S.,  1970–
1989 (percentages)  
 
Germany Japan U.K. U.S.
Internal 80.6 69.3 97.3 91.3
Bank finance 11 30.5 19.5 16.6
Bonds -0.6 4.7 3.5 17.1
New equity 0.9 3.7 -10.4 -8.8
Trade Credit -1.9 -8.1 -1.4 -3.7
Capital transfers 8.5 - 2.5 -
Other 1.5 -0.1 -2.9 -3.8
Statistical adj. 0 0 -8 -8.7  
 
Source: Corbett and Jenkinson (1994) 
 
Myers and Majluf (1984) showed long ago that this pattern of finance can arise 
from the existence of asymmetric information between managers and the world 
outside the corporation. Singh (2003) suggested that these considerations apply 
with even greater force to developing countries. This is because with imperfect 
capital markets developing country corporations may be expected to be obliged 
to rely largely on self-financing for their expansion; in addition, they will be 
reluctant to issue equity capital for fear of losing control of the corporation.  
 
Thus, economic analysis predicts that developing country corporations should  
depend more on internal finance and less on equity than corporation of 
advanced countries. The empirical results are not compatible with this 
proposition.  
 
How does one explain these theoretically anomalous results in Tables 4 and 5? 
The first point here is that the two tables are using different sources of data and 
are answering different questions.  Singh’s 1995 study was based on the data for 
the 1980s. For the 1990s there is now more comprehensive data available which 
raises the issue whether these anomalous results for the 1980s continue into the 
1990s.  
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Table 6 provides information on this subject for firms in 22 developing and 22 
advanced countries for the period 1995-2000.  This is a more comprehensive 
dataset that which was available in the 1980s. Exactly the same methodology is 
used to measure financing of corporate growth.  The results show that for the 
1990s, the pecking order pattern of finance is decisively rejected for both rich 
and poor countries. Also, what stands out is the high recourse to equity finance 
by developing country corporations. (For a full discussion and explanation of 
these anomalous results, termed as the Singh paradox by Dennis Muller see 
Singh (2003) and Gugler et al 2003). 
 
Table 6: Financing of corporate growth in 19 developing countries and 22 
advanced countries for 1995-2000*  
 
 
AUSTRALIA 58% 32% 11% ARGENTI 46% 16% 38%
AUSTRIA 52% 3% 45% BRAZIL 74% 11% 15%
BELGIUM 56% 6% 38% CHILE 44% 33% 23%
BERMUDA 41% 23% 36% COLOMBI 73% 16% 11%
CANADA 56% 32% 12% CZECH  33% 21% 46%
CAYMAN ISLANDS 90% 8% 2% HONG  44% 20% 35%
DENMARK 72% 6% 23% HUNGAR 28% 1% 71%
FINLAND 53% 26% 22% INDIA 53% 5% 43%
FRANCE 61% 7% 31% INDONESI 110% 12% -23%
GERMANY 62% 5% 33% ISRAEL 54% 6% 40%
GREECE 52% 34% 14% KOREA 27% 48% 25%
IRELAND 76% 5% 18% MALAYSI 40% 18% 42%
ITALY 68% 5% 27% MEXICO 61% 30% 10%
JAPAN 62% 6% 32% PHILIPPIN 34% 17% 49%
NETHERLANDS 65% 9% 26% SOUTH  49% 10% 41%
NORWAY 50% 23% 27% TAIWAN 59% 40% 1%
SINGAPORE 66% 15% 19% THAILAN 74% 11% 15%
1 SPAIN 68% -9% 40% TURKEY 61% 18% 21%
SWEDEN 57% 4% 39% VENEZUE 27% 54% 19%
SWITZERLAND 54% 7% 39%
UNITED KINGDOM 52% 21% 27%
UNITED STATES 47% 21% 32%
Group Average 53% 17% 30% 35% 39% 27%
Global Average 49% 22% 29%





Filter: Companies are excluded if any of their ratios are outside [-200,+200]  
Sample Size: 3360   
*  The basis of figures in this table is the same as that for Table 4. The only   difference is that 
instead of net assets, this table considers corporate growth in terms of percentage change in total 
assets. The latter is decomposed into growth of liabilities, of equity finance and that of internal 
finance.   
1.       Spain has 18 companies, one of which experienced a small decline in total assets over 
1995-00.  That company also saw external equity increase, which resulted in a large negative 
value for the external equity ratio.  
Excluding that one company the sample mean of the ratio is 3%; the internal equity ratio would 
decline accordingly.   
 
Source: Glen and Singh (2005)    20 
Next  we  take  up  the  implications  of  these  observed  patterns  of  financing 
corporate growth for corporate governance. The empirical results show prima 
facie  that  new  issues  on  the  stock  market  are  relatively  more  important  for 
corporations in emerging countries than for those in advanced countries, making 
the former apparently more subject to the influence of the stock market than the 
latter. There are in principle three channels through which corporate governance 
may be affected by the stock market: a) the regulatory framework of the stock 
market  itself  concerning  standards  for  corporate  accounts,  disclosure  of 
information about major changes in corporate activities, transparency, etc., b) 
the pricing process on the stock market and c) the take-over process.  It is worth 
noting that although AC corporations do not use stock market as much as the 
DC corporations to raise equity capital, the former are paradoxically subject to 
greater discipline of the stock market than are the latter. This is because of the 
existence of a highly active market for corporate control in the U.S. and the 
U.K. so that even firms which never go to the stock market to raise funds, 
nevertheless, become subject to take-over discipline. The nature of discipline 
imposed  by  the  stock  market  through  the  take-over  mechanism  has  been 
discussed in detail in the last section. It falls far short of what is required and 
indeed creates major distortions of its own particularly for developing countries. 
The  stock  market  pricing  process  and  the  take-over  mechanism  are  not  in 
general very helpful in improving economic performance in advanced countries 
and there are good reasons to suggest that they are even less likely to do so in 
developing countries. 
 
To  illustrate,  consider  the  Indian  case.  India,  like  many  other  developing 
countries, has large, potentially predatory conglomerate groups (Singh, 1995). 
As suggested earlier, if there was a market for corporate control these groups 
could  take  over  smaller,  more  efficient  firms  and  thereby  reduce  potential 
competition to the detriment of the real economy. Also as noted above, the 
development of an active market for corporate control may encourage managers 
to  ‘empire-build’  not  only  to  increase  their  monopoly  power  but  also  to 
progressively shield themselves from takeover by becoming larger. 
 
However,  the  market  for  corporate  control  in  developing  countries  remains 
rudimentary because, shareholdings are not widely dispersed and standards of 
disclosure are not conducive to takeovers.  It is therefore not surprising that 
hostile takeovers are rare in developing countries. However, this situation may 
change  if  large  international  MNCs  are  allowed  to  engage  in  takeovers  in 
developing countries.  Domestic firms, with their limited funds and relatively 
restricted access to international capital markets, would not be able to either 
compete with or resist the MNCs.    21 
There are also other potential factors that could lead financial liberalisation and 
stock markets to have a negative effect on corporate governance.  Financial 
liberalisation establishes a strong link between two potentially volatile markets, 
the stock market and the foreign exchange market.  The Asian crisis of 1997-
1998 demonstrated that there could be a strong negative feedback relationship 
between  a  falling  stock  market  and  a  depreciating  currency.    As  the  stock 
market declines, investors pull out of the  market  and  move their funds into 
foreign currency.  The depreciating currency, in turn, lowers real returns on the 
stock market which in turn propels the cycle.
3  Such a collapse in currency and 
equity values of course, ultimately may encourage ‘fire-sale-type FDI’ in the 
form  of  takeovers,  (suggesting  that  the  expected  rate  of  return  measured  in 
foreign currency has increased sufficiently due to the steep decline in domestic 
share  prices).    This  may  overturn  quite  successful  corporate  governance 
structures and replace them with ones that are less suited.   
 
To sum up, the above considerations together suggest that the greater influence 
of the stock market on developing country corporations is unlikely to improve 
corporate governance in these countries but may on the contrary make it worse.  
 
6. Legal Origin, Corporate Law, Corporate Finance and the Stock Market  
The International Financial Institutions’ (IFIs) preference for the Anglo-Saxon 
model of corporate governance is based on what they regard as ‘best practice’. 
Conspicuously, it is not based on systematic theoretical analysis or rigorous 
empirical  research.  However,  a  recent  series  of  papers  by  Rafael  La  Porta, 
Florencio  Lopez-de-Silanes,  Andrei  Schleifer  and  Robert  Vishny  (hereafter 
referred to as LLSV) on law and finance has helped fill these theoretical and 
empirical lacunae.   
 
The LLSV thesis  
The central proposition of the by now fairly extensive literature generated by 
LLSV  and  their  colleagues  is  that  there  is  a  systematic  causal  relationship 
between  the  legal  framework,  the  corporate  financing  patterns,  corporate 
behaviour and performance, and overall economic growth.  The LLSV analysis 
is based on an empirical and theoretical evaluation of different legal systems 
whose historical origins are exogenous (or, in the case of LDCs, they are a 
legacy of colonial rule).  The main analysis focuses on the differences between 
the common and civil law traditions.   
 
A distinguishing characteristic of these contributions is their strong empirical 
emphasis. The empirical results presented by LLSV indicate that the predictions 
of the legal origin model are verified by empirical evidence.    22 
The Berglof and von Thadden Critique  
There are, among others, two significant lines of criticism that can be directed 
against  this  body  of  thought.  The  first,  articulated  by  Berglof  and  von 
Thadden,(1999)  finds  the  theoretical  framework  presented  in  LLSV  far  too 
limited  for  examining  corporate  governance  issues  in  developing  countries. 
LLSV  appear  to  be  solely  interested  in  the  question  of  the  protection  for 
providers of external finance to the exclusion of other significant stakeholders 
in the firm.  
 
Berglof and von Thadden also note that the reference point for the LLSV study 
is the widely-held, Berle and Means-type corporation which is prevalent mainly 
in the United States and the United Kingdom.  
 
The typical firm in developing countries, however, is a family-controlled or 
closely-held by block holders, i.e. it has concentrated share ownership.  The 
important  corporate  governance  problem  for  this  class  of  firms  is  not  legal 
protection for outside shareholders but rather the problems of family succession 
and maintaining family control while raising funds from outside investors.   
 
The LLSV argument is also susceptible to the fact that the direction of causality 
between legal system and financial structure could run in either direction.  The 
legal system may lead to the formation of a certain financial structure, as LLSV 
maintain, but it is at least equally plausible that the financial structure may also 
lead to the creation of legal norms.  
 
It  is  important  to  note  that  even  on  its  own  terms,  maximising  investor 
protection  cannot  be  optimal.    It  will  result  in  the  dilution  of  efficiency 
advantages deriving from the lower agency costs of concentrated ownership.   
 
The Glen, Lee and Singh analysis  
The  second  and  rather  different  critical  line  of  argument  against  the  central 
LLSV thesis has been presented by Glen, Lee and Singh (2001). They suggest 
that over the past 50 years there have  been  major changes in the economic 
regime and in the role of stock markets in India. These have occurred without 
any fundamental changes in India’s constitution, basic legal framework or its 
legal origins. Rather, the law has shown itself to be able to accommodate the 
needs and desires of India’s economic policy makers.  
 
To illustrate, following independence from colonial rule, India embarked on a 
‘socialist pattern of development’. It nationalised the ‘commanding heights’ of 
the economy – strategic industries. The private sector was heavily regulated and   23 
private investment by large corporations was not permitted without government 
permission. Thirty years later the government decided that this was the wrong 
path and they took major steps to de-regulate and privatise the economy. In both 
these dramatic episodes the common law tradition India had inherited from the 
British continued to work. The law became the hand-maid of politics rather than 
being a prime mover. 
 
Finally, the LLSV thesis concerning legal origin has been subject to a more 
detailed critical analysis by Fagernas, Sarkar and Singh (2008) and Armour et al 
(2007). These studies are based on new time series data and they decisively 
reject or substantially modify LLSV’s core propositions. 
 
7. Natural Progression and Econometric Studies 
One hypothesis which can certainly be refuted, even by broad brush data is that 
of  natural  progression  mentioned  in  section  II.  This  theory  suggests  that  as 
countries develop they establish stock markets and stock market development is 
therefore an emblem of economic development.  
 
Two  kinds  of  evidence  are  relevant  here.  The  first  is  the  observation  that 
economic  miracles  which  have  occurred  in  the  second  half  of  the  twentieth 
century, hardly any can be ascribed to stock market development. Thus, in post-
World War II Europe – the Italian Miracle, the German miracle, the Austrian 
miracle and in Asia, the justly famous miracles of Korea or Taiwan, did not 
depend  conspicuously  on  the  equity  or  bond  markets  in  these  countries. 
Similarly, the second kind of evidence relevant here consists of an examination 
of  comparative  growth  rates  over  a  one  hundred  year  time  span.  Such  an 
examination reveals that the bank-based countries (e.g. Germany and France) 
have as good if not a better long-term record of economic growth as do US and 
UK. Pagano (1993) notes that the Italian stock market was bigger a hundred 
years ago, than it was until a decade ago. The Italian economy evidently grew 
during these hundred years without any expansion of the stock market.  
 
Turning from the crude historical evidence above to more precise quantitative 
and econometric studies, the pioneering contribution of Goldsmith (1969), on 
the relationship between finance and growth has been followed by econometric 
exercises.  An  important  issue  in  this  research  has  been  the  causal  question 
whether finance causes growth or economic growth leads to the development of 
the financial system. Another issue which has received attention is whether the 
banks and stock markets complement each other in causing economic growth or 
whether they are substitutes. 
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Levine (1997; 1998) found a positive relationship between banks and economic 
growth, but he did not control for stock market development. Levine and Zervos 
(1998) found that stock market and bank development complement each other 
in assisting economic growth. This finding is confirmed by Beck and Levine 
(2004) which improves upon earlier studies in terms of both methodology and 
for being able to control for any other relevant variables. On the other hand, 
Atje and Jonanovic concluded in an earlier 1993 study that while stock markets 
positively affect growth, rasing it by a huge 2.5 percent per annum banks, had 
little  influence,  Sarkar  examines  the  long-term  relationship  between  stock 
market development and rate of investment in India over  a fifty-year period 
from  1950  –  2000.  Using  time-series  analysis,  he  found  no  long-term 
relationship between the two variables.  
 
Apart from their mixed results, there are important methodological limitations 
of  these  econometric  exercises.  Firstly,  as  Arestis  and  Demetriades  (1997) 
noted, most of the studies are based on reduced form analysis and are therefore 
difficult  to  interpret  in  causal  terms.  Secondly,  they  ignore  altogether  the 
evidence presented in the earlier sections on the observed inefficiencies of the 
pricing and takeover mechanism on the stock markets. These methodological 
limitations are serious and detract from the value of this research. 
 
8.  Stock Market Regulation and Developing Countries 
There was an enormous expansion of DC stock markets in the 1980s and 1990s 
in the wake of financial liberalisation in many of these countries. Compared 
with the highly organised and extensively regulated stock market activity in the 
US and the UK, most DCs do not have such well-functioning markets.  Not 
only  is  there  inadequate  government  regulation,  but  private  information 
gathering and disseminating firms are also often absent in DCs. These markets 
continue to suffer from significant regulatory and informational deficits: most 
DC markets remain ‘immature’ (i.e., riddled with insider trading and lack of 
transparency) and relatively illiquid. Most trading takes place in a few blue-chip 
shares (Singh, 1995; 1997). 
 
DCs have found it difficult to regulate stock markets, as is indicated by frequent 
scams  on  DC  stock  markets.  This  should  not  be  surprising  as  even  highly 
regulated and well-functioning markets, such as those of the US, from time to 
time experience episodes such as those of Enron and WorldCom. Nevertheless, 
Singh  (1998)  has  argued  that  one  regulatory  reform,  which  would  be 
particularly useful for DCs, is to stop the emergence of a market for corporate 
control.  Such a market, as indicated above, exacerbates the negative effects of 
stock  markets  (e.g.  short-termism)  from  the  perspective  of  economic   25 
development.  This reform may however involve major changes in company 
law, reducing the role of shareholders and enhancing that of stakeholders or the 
government in takeover situations. DC governments need to find cheaper and 
more efficient ways of changing corporate managements than the lottery and the 
huge expense of the market for corporate control.  They should also encourage 
product market competition to discipline corporations rather than rely on the 
stock market alone for this purpose. 
 
As seen earlier, there are good theoretical reasons as well as evidence for the 
volatility of DC share prices.  Volatility is, however, further accentuated if DCs 
allow external portfolio capital inflows.  This greatly increases the vulnerability 
of the economy not only to international shocks, but also to domestic shocks, 
substantially magnifying their effects. The main reason for this is that capital 
inflows lead to an interaction between two inherently unstable markets – the 
stock market and the currency market.  In the event of a large shock (domestic 
or external) these interactions generate a negative feedback that may lead to, or 
greatly worsen, a financial crisis. 
 
9. Conclusion 
This  paper  has  provided  a  comprehensive  review  of  the  role  of  the  stock 
markets in economic development. It has surveyed analyses and evidence from 
both developed and developing countries in order to assess how best, if at all, 
can stock markets contribute to economic growth.   
 
The paper has two main messages – First, in relation to low-income developing 
countries  which  do  not  yet  have  established  stock  markets  or  have  only 
rudimentary  ones.  It  is  suggested  that  these  countries  will  be  better  off  by 
encouraging  the  development  of  banks  rather  than  expend  their  human  and 
material  resources  on  establishing  stock  markets.  As  far  as  middle-income 
countries are concerned, many of whom have well established stock markets, 
these must be regulated to ensure that they do not become a source of instability 
or  short-termism  in  the  economy.  For  this  reason,  middle-income  countries 
should  discourage  the  emergence  of  a  market  for  corporate  control.  These 
countries  should  find  other  institutional  ways  of  replacing  inefficient 
managements which are reliable and cheap compared with the takeover device 
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Notes
 
1 Keynes observed, ‘When the capital development of a country becomes a by-
product of the activities of a casino, the job is likely to be ill-done’ (Keynes, 
1936 Ch. 12.) The classic reference to this literature is J.K. Galbraith’s ‘The 
Great Crash’, 1929, Boston: Houghton Mifflin 1961. 
2  See  further,  Singh  (1990)  on  the  establishment  of  the  stock  market  in  a 
socialist economy. See also Singh (1993). 
3 This section  and the next  rely heavily on and updates the discussion of Singh, 





























Allen, F. and Gale, D. (2000) Comparing Financial Systems, the MIT press, 
Massachusetts. 
Aresits, P., Demetriades, P. and Luintel, K. (2001) ‘Financial Development and 
Economic  Growth:    The  Role  of  Stock  Markets’,  Journal  of  Money, 
Credit and Banking, 33(1), 16-41. 
Barberis , Nicholas and Thaler, Richard H. (2003) ‘ A Survey of Behavioral 
Finance.  ‘  In  Handbook  of  the  Economics  of  Finance.  George  M. 
Constantinides, Milton Harris, and Rene' Stultz editors. Elsevier Science, 
North Holland, Amsterdam. 
Black, B. and Gilson, R. (1998) ‘Venture capital and the structure of capital 
markets: banks versus stock markets’, Journal of Financial Economics, 
Volume 47, No.8, 243-277. 
Berglof,  E.,  Von  Thadden,  L.  (1999)  ‘The  Changing  Corporate  Governance 
Paradigm:  Implications  for  Transition  and  Developing  Countries. 
Unpublished  Working  Paper,  Stockholm  Institute  of  Transition 
Economics, Stockholm, Sweden. 
Corbett,  J.,  Jenkinson,  T.  (1994)  ‘The  Financing  of  Industry,  1970-89:  An 
International Comparison. Discussion Paper No. 984. London: Centre for 
Economic policy Research. 
Fama, E. (1970) ‘Efficient capital markets: A review of theory and empirical 
work’. Journal of Finance, vol. 25, 383-417. 
Feldstein, M. (1998) ‘Trying to do too much’, Financial Times, March 3, 1998. 
Galbraith, J.K. (1929) ‘The Great Crash’ Houghton Mifflin, Boston 
Glen, J., Lee, K., Singh, A. (2001) ‘Persistence of profitability and Competition 
in Emerging Markets’, Economic Letters, volume 72, pp. 247-253.       
Greenspan,  A.  (1998)  ‘Testimony  before  the  Committee  on  Banking  and 
Financial Services, US House of Representatives, January 30, 1998. 
Grossman, S and Hart, O. (1980) ‘Take-over bids, the free-rider problem, and 
the theory of the corporation’. Bell Journal of Economics, 11, 42-64.  
Gugler,K., Mueller, D. and Yurtoglu, B. (2004). ‘Corporate Governance and 
Globalization’.Oxford  Review  of  Economic  Policy,  Special  Issue  on 
Globalisation, Vol.20, Issue1, 129-156. 
Hong,  H.  and  Stein,  J.C.  (2007)  ‘Disagreement  and  the  Stock  Market’,  The 
Journal of Economic Perspectives, Spring 2007, Volume 21, No.2, 109-
128.   28 
 
Hoshi, T. and Kashyap, A. (2001) Corporate Financing and Governance in 
Japan: The Road to the Future, the MIT press, Massachusetts. 
Jensen, M.  (1978) ‘ Some anomalies evidence regarding market efficiency’, 
Journal of Financial Economics, 6, 95-101 
Jensen,  M.  (1988)  ‘Take-overs:  their  causes  and  consequences’.  Journal  of 
Economic Perspectives, 2(1), 21–48.  
Keynes, J. M. (1936) The General Theory of Money, Interest and Employment. 
Macmillan, London. 
King,  R.G.  and  Levine,  R.  (1993)  ‘Financial  Intermediation  and  Economic 
Development.’ In Capital Markets and Financial Intermediation (eds.), 
Colin  Mayer  and  Xavier  Vives).  Cambridge:  Cambridge  University 
Press.  
Lavington, F. (1921) ‘The English Capital Market’. Methuen, London. 
Levine, R. (1997) ‘ Financial Development and Economic Growth: Views and 
Agenda’. Journal of Economic Literature, June, 35 (2), 688-726 
Levine,  R.  and  Zervos,  S.  (1998)  ‘Stock  Markets,  Banks,  and  Economic 
Growth’. The American Economic Review, Vol. 88 (3) 537-558. 
Myers,  S.C.  and  Majluf,  N.S.  (1984).  ‘Corporate  financing  and  investment 
decisions  when  firms  have  information  that  investors  do  not  have’. 
Journal of Financial economics, vol. 13, pp. 187-221. 
Pagano, M., (1993) ‘Financial Markets & Growth: An Overview’. American 
Economic Review, 37,  613-22.   
Porter,  M.E.  (1992)  ‘Capital  Disadvantage:  America’s  Failing  Capital 
Investment System’. Harvard Business Review, Vol, no?, 65-82. 
Ravenscraft, D.J., and. Scherer, F.M (1987) Mergers, Sell Offs and Economic 
Efficiency. Brookings Institution.  
Reisen, Helmut, (1994) ‘On the Wealth of Nations and Retirees’. In Finance 
and the International Economy, 8: Prize Essays in Memory of Robert 
Marjolin.  Oxford University Press for American Express Bank Ltd, New 
York, pp.??-?? 
Scherer, F. M. (2006) ‘A New Retrospective on Mergers’, Review of Industrial 
Organization,  Volume 28, Issue 4, June 2006, 327-341. 
Shiller, R.J., (2000) ‘Irrational Exuberance’, Princeton University Press, New 
Jersey.   29 
Shleifer,  A.,  (2000)  ‘Inefficient  Markets:  An  Introduction  to  Behavioural 
Finance’, Oxford University Press, Oxford. 
Singh,  A.  (1992)  ‘Corporate  Take-Overs.’.  In  J.  Eatwell,  M.Milgate  and 
P.Newman (eds.),The New Palgrave Dictionary of Money and Finance, 
London, Macmillan, pp.480-486. 
Singh,  A.  (1993)  ‘The  Stock  Market  and  Economic  Development:  Should 
Developing Countries Encourage Stock Markets?’ UNCTAD Review, 4, 
1-28. 
Singh, A. (1995) ‘Corporate Financial Patterns in Industrialising Economies. A 
Comparative International Study’. IFC Technical Paper No.2, The World 
Bank, Washington, DC.  
Singh,  A.  (1997)  ‘Financial  Liberalisation,  Stock  Markets  and  Economic 
Development’. Economic Journal, vol.107, 771-782. 
Singh,  A.  (1998)  ‘Liberalisation,  The  Stock  Market  and  the  Market  for 
Corporate Control: A Bridge Too Far for the Indian Economy?’ In Ishar 
Judge Ahluwalia and IMD Little (eds.), India’s Economic Reforms and 
Development:  Essays  for  Manmohan  Singh,  Oxford  University  Press, 
Oxford. pp. 169-196. 
Singh, A. (1999) ‘Should Africa Promote Stock Market Capitalism?’ Journal of 
International Development, vol. 11(?), 343-365. 
Singh, A. and Glen, J. (2005) ‘Corporate governance, competition and finance: 
rethinking  lessons  from  the  Asian  crisis’  Eastern  Economic  Journal, 
Volume 31, 219-243. 
Singh, A. (2005) ‘Globalisation and the Regulation of FDI:  New  Proposals 
from the European Community and Japan’,  Contributions to Political 
Economy, Vol. 24, 99-121. 
Stiglitz, J. (1994) ‘The Role of the State in Financial Markets’. Proceedings of 
the  World  Bank  Annual  Conference  on  Development  Economics,  The 
World Bank, Washington, DC. 
Sudweeks, L.B. (1990) Equity Market Development in Developing Countries, 
New York, Westport, Connecticut, London. 
Summers, L.H. (1999) Quoted in article ‘Winning ways: ready bucks and a flair 
of risk’, Financial Times, 14 December 1999. 
Thomas, W. (1973) ‘The Provincial Stock Exchanges’. Frank Cass, London. 
Tobin,  J.,  (1984)  ‘On  the  efficiency  of  the  financial  system’.  Lloyds  Bank 
Review, July, 1-15.   30 
Tichy,  G.  (2002)  ‘What  do  we  know  about  the  success  and  failure  of 
mergers?’Journal of Industry, Competition and Trade, Vol.1, Issue 4. 
WIDER  (1990)  Foreign  Portfolio  Investment  in  Emerging  Equity  Markets. 
Study  Group  Series  No.5.  Helsinki,  World  Institute  for  Development 
Economics Research of the United Nations University. 
World  Bank  (1989)  World  Development  Report,  World  Bank,  Oxford 
University Press.  
World Bank (1993) The East Asian Miracle, World Bank, Oxford University 
Press, New York. 
World  Bank  (1989)  World  Development  Report,  World  Bank,  Oxford 
University Press. New York.  
World  Bank  (2002)  World  Development  Report,  World  Bank,  Oxford 
University Press. New York.  
Yartey,  C.  (2008)  ‘The  Determinants  of  Stock  Market  Development  in 
Emerging Economies: Is South Africa Different?’, IMF Working Paper, 
WP/08/32, International Monetary Fund. 
 
 
 